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Robust Anomaly Detection in Dynamic Networks ∗
Jing Wang† and Ioannis Ch. Paschalidis‡
Abstract— We propose two robust methods for anomaly
detection in dynamic networks in which the properties of
normal traffic are time-varying. We formulate the robust
anomaly detection problem as a binary composite hypothesis
testing problem and propose two methods: a model-free and
a model-based one, leveraging techniques from the theory of
large deviations. Both methods require a family of Probability
Laws (PLs) that represent normal properties of traffic. We
devise a two-step procedure to estimate this family of PLs.
We compare the performance of our robust methods and
their vanilla counterparts, which assume that normal traffic is
stationary, on a network with a diurnal normal pattern and a
common anomaly related to data exfiltration. Simulation results
show that our robust methods perform better than their vanilla
counterparts in dynamic networks.
Index Terms— Robust statistical anomaly detection, large
deviations theory, set covering, binary composite hypothesis
testing.
I. INTRODUCTION
A network anomaly is any potentially malicious traffic
sequence that has implications for the security of the net-
work. Although automated online traffic anomaly detection
has received a lot of attention, this field is far from mature.
Network anomaly detection belongs to a broader field
of system anomaly detection whose approaches can be
roughly grouped into two classes: signature-based anomaly
detection, where known patterns of past anomalies are used
to identify ongoing anomalies [1], [2], and change-based
anomaly detection that identifies patterns that substantially
deviate from normal patterns of operations [3], [4], [5]. [6]
showed that the detection rates of systems based on pattern
matching are below 70%. Furthermore, such systems cannot
detect zero-day attacks, i.e., attacks not previously seen, and
need constant (and expensive) updating to keep up with
new attack signatures. In contrast, change-based anomaly
detection methods are considered to be more economic and
promising since they can identify novel attacks. In this work
we focus on change-based anomaly detection methods, in
particular on statistical anomaly detection that leverages
statistical methods.
Standard statistical anomaly detection consists of two
steps. The first step is to learn the “normal behavior” by
analyzing past system behavior; usually a segment of records
corresponding to normal system activity. The second step is
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to identify time instances where system behavior does not
appear to be normal by monitoring the system continuously.
For anomaly detection in networks, [5] presents two meth-
ods to characterize normal behavior and to assess deviations
from it based on the Large Deviations Theory (LDT) [7].
Both methods consider the traffic, which is a sequence of
flows, as a sample path of an underlying stochastic process
and compare current network traffic to some reference net-
work traffic using LDT. One method, which is referred to
as the model-free method, employs the method of types [7]
to characterize the type (i.e., empirical measure) of an
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence of
network flows. The other method, which is referred to as the
model-based method, models traffic as a Markov Modulated
Process. Both methods rely on a stationarity assumption
postulating that the properties of normal traffic in networks
do not change over time.
However, the stationarity assumption is rarely satisfied in
contemporary networks [8]. For example, Internet traffic is
subject to weekly and diurnal variations [9], [10]. Internet
traffic is also influenced by macroscopic factors such as
important holidays and events [11]. Similar phenomena arise
in local area networks as well. We will call a network
dynamic if its traffic exhibits time-varying behavior.
The challenges for anomaly detection of dynamic net-
works are two-fold. First, the methods used for learning the
“normal behavior” are usually quite sensitive to the presence
of non-stationarity. Second, the modeling and prediction of
multi-dimensional and time-dependent behavior is hard.
To address these challenges, we generalize the vanilla
model-free and model-based methods from [5] and develop
what we call the robust model-free and the robust model-
based methods. The novelties of our new methods are as
follows. First, our methods are robust and optimal in the
generalized Neyman-Pearson sense. Second, we propose a
two-stage method to estimate Probability Laws (PLs) that
characterize normal system behaviors. Our two-stage method
transforms a hard problem (i.e., estimating PLs for multi-
dimensional data) into two well-studied problems: (i) es-
timating one-dimensional data parameters and (ii) the set
cover problem. Being concise and interpretable, our esti-
mated PLs are helpful not only in anomaly detection but
also in understanding normal system behavior.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Sec. II formulates
system anomaly detection as a binary composite hypothesis
testing problem and proposes two robust methods. Sec. III
applies the methods presented in Sec. II. Sec. IV explains
the simulation setup and presents results from our robust
methods as well as their vanilla counterparts. Finally, Sec. V
provides concluding remarks.
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II. BINARY COMPOSITE HYPOTHESIS TESTING
We model the network environment as a stochastic process
and estimate its parameters through some reference traffic
(viewed as sample paths). Then the problem of network
anomaly detection is equivalent to testing whether a sequence
of observations G = {g1, . . . , gn} is a sample path of a
discrete-time stochastic process G = {G1, . . . , Gn} (hypoth-
esis H0). All random variables Gi are discrete and their
sample space is a finite alphabet Σ = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σ|Σ|},
where |Σ| denotes the cardinality of Σ. All observed symbols
gi belong to Σ, too. This problem is a binary composite
hypothesis testing problem. Because the joint distribution of
all random variables Gi in G becomes complex when n is
large, we propose two types of simplification.
A. A model-free method
We propose a model-free method that assumes the random
variables Gi are i.i.d. Each Gi takes the value σj with
probability pFθ (G
i = σj), j = 1, . . . , |Σ|, which is parame-
terized by θ ∈ Ω. We refer to the vector pFθ = (pFθ (Gi =
σ1), . . . , p
F
θ (G
i = σ|Σ|)) as the model-free Probability Law
(PL) associated with θ. Then the family of model-free PLs
PF =
{
pFθ : θ ∈ Ω
}
characterizes the stochastic process G .
To characterize the observation G, let
E GF (σj) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1(gi = σj), j = 1, . . . , |Σ|, (1)
where 1(·) is an indicator function. Then, an estimate for
the underlying model-free PL based on the observation G
is EGF =
{
E GF (σj) : j = 1, . . . , |Σ|
}
, which is called the
model-free empirical measure of G.
Suppose µ = (µ(σ1), . . . , µ(σ|Σ|)) is a model-free PL and
ν = (ν(σ1), . . . , ν(σ|Σ|)) is a model-free empirical measure.
To quantify the difference between µ and ν, we define the
model-free divergence between µ and ν as
DF (ν‖µ) ,
|Σ|∑
j=1
νˆ(σj) log
νˆ(σj)
µˆ(σj)
, (2)
where νˆ(σj) = max(ν(σj), ε) and µˆ(σj) =
max(ν(σj), ε),∀j and ε is a small positive constant
introduced to avoid underflow and division by zero.
Definition 1
(Model-Free Generalized Hoeffding Test). The model-free
generalized Hoeffding test [12] is to reject H0 if G is in
S∗F = {G | inf
θ∈Ω
DF (EGF ‖pFθ ) ≥ λ},
where λ is a detection threshold and infθ∈Ω DF (EGF ‖pFθ ) is
referred to as the generalized model-free divergence between
EGF and PF =
{
pFθ : θ ∈ Ω
}
.
A similar definition has been proposed for robust localization
in sensor networks [13]. One can show that this generalized
Hoeffding test is asymptotically (as n → ∞) optimal in a
generalized Neyman-Pearson sense; we omit the technical
details in the interest of space.
B. A model-based method
We now turn to the model-based method where the random
process G = {G1, . . . , Gn} is assumed to be a Markov
chain. Under this assumption, the joint distribution of G
becomes pθ (G = G) = pBθ
(
g1
)∏n−1
i=1 p
B
θ
(
gi+1 | gi), where
pBθ (·) is the initial distribution and pBθ (· | ·) is the transition
probability; all parametrized by θ ∈ Ω.
Let pBθ (σi, σj) be the probability of seeing two con-
secutive states (σi, σj). We refer to the matrix PBθ =
{pBθ (σi, σj)}|Σ|i,j=1 as the model-based PL associated with
θ ∈ Ω. Then, the family of model-based PLs PB ={
PBθ : θ ∈ Ω
}
characterizes the stochastic process G .
To characterize the observation G, let
E GB (σi, σj) =
1
n
n∑
l=2
1(gl−1 = σi, gl = σj), i, j = 1, . . . , |Σ|.
(3)
We define the model-based empirical measure of G as the
matrix EGB = {E GB (σi, σj)}|Σ|i,j=1. The transition probability
from σi to σj is simply E GB (σj |σi) = E
G
B (σi,σj)∑|Σ|
j=1 E
G
B (σi,σj)
.
Suppose Π = {pi(σi, σj)}|Σ|i,j=1 is a model-based PL and
Q = {q(σi, σj)}|Σ|i,j=1 is a model-based empirical measure.
Let pˆi(σj |σi) and qˆ(σj |σi) be the corresponding transition
probabilities from σi to σj . Then, the model-based diver-
gence between Π and Q is
DB(Q ‖ Π) =
|Σ|∑
i=1
|Σ|∑
j=1
qˆ(σi, σj) log
qˆ(σj |σi)
pˆi(σj |σi) , (4)
where qˆ(σi, σj) = max(q(σi, σj), ε), pˆi(σi, σj) =
max(pi(σi, σj), ε) for some small positive constant ε intro-
duced to avoid underflow and division by zero. Similar to
the model-free case, we present the following definition:
Definition 2
(Model-Based Generalized Hoeffding Test). The model-based
generalized Hoeffding test is to reject H0 when G is in
S∗B = {G | inf
θ∈Ω
DB(EGB‖PBθ ) ≥ λ},
where λ is a detection threshold and infθ∈Ω DB(EGB‖PBθ )
is referred to as the generalized model-based divergence
between EGF and PB =
{
PBθ : θ ∈ Ω
}
.
In this case as well, asymptotic (generalized) Neyman-
Pearson optimality can be established.
III. NETWORK ANOMALY DETECTION
Fig. 1 outlines the structure of our robust anomaly de-
tection methods. We first propose our feature set (Sec. III-
A). We assume that the normal traffic is governed by an
underlying stochastic process G . We assume the size of
model-free and model-based PL families to be finite and
propose a two-step procedure to estimate PLs from some
reference data. We first inspect each feature separately to
generate a family of candidate PLs (Sec.III-C), which is then
reduced to a smaller family of PLs (Sec. III-D). For each
window, the algorithm applies the model-free and model-
based generalized Hoeffding test discussed above.
3Window 1 PL 1 PL N
Window 2
Window 3
Generalized Hypothesis Testing
Window buffer
...
...
PL Refinement
Reference Flows
 PL Candidates Rough Estimation
Fig. 1. Structure of the algorithms.
A. Data representation
In this paper, we focus on host-based anomaly detection,
a specific application in which we monitor the incoming and
outgoing packets of a server. We assume that the server
provides only one service (e.g., HTTP server) and other
ports are either closed or outside our interests. As a result,
we only monitor traffic on certain port (e.g., port 80 for
HTTP service). For servers with multiple ports in need of
monitoring, we can simply run our methods on each port.
The features we propose for this particular application
relate to a flow representation slightly different from that
of commercial vendors like Cisco NetFlow [14]. Hereafter,
we will use “flows”, “traffic”, and “data” interchangeably.
Let S = {s1, . . . , s|S|} denote the collection of all packets
collected on certain port of the host which is monitored. In
host-based anomaly detection, the server IP is always fixed,
thus ignored. Denote the user IP address in packet si as
xi, whose format will be discussed later. The size of si is
bi ∈ [0,∞) in bytes and the start time of transmission is
ti ∈ [0,∞) in seconds. Using this convention, packet si can
be represented as (xi, bi, tis) for all i = 1, . . . , |S|.
We compile a sequence of packets s1, . . . , sm with t1s <
· · · < tms into a flow f = (x, b, dt, t) if x = x1 = · · · = xm
and tis − ti−1s < δF for i = 2, . . . ,m and some prescribed
δF ∈ (0,∞). Here, the flow size b is the sum of the sizes
of the packets that comprise the flow. The flow duration is
dt = t
m
s − t1s. The flow transmission time t equals the start
time of the first packet of the flow t1s. In this way, we can
translate the large collection of packets S into a relatively
small collection of flows F .
Suppose X is the set of unique IP addresses in F . Viewing
each IP as a tuple of integers, we apply typical K-means
clustering on X . For each x ∈ X , we thus obtain a cluster
label k(x). Suppose the cluster center for cluster k is x¯k;
then the distance of x to the corresponding cluster center is
da(x) = d(x, x¯
k(x)), for some appropriate distance metric.
The cluster label k(x) and distance to cluster center da(x)
are used to identify a user IP address x, leading to our final
representation of a flow as:
f = (k(x), da(x), b, dt, t). (5)
For each f , we quantize da(x), b, and dt to discrete values.
Each tuple of (k(x), da(x), b, dt) corresponds to a symbol
in Σ = {1, . . . ,K} × Σda × Σb × Σdt , where Σda , Σb and
Σdt are the quantization alphabets for distance to cluster
center, flow size, and flow duration, respectively. Denoting
by g the corresponding quantized symbol of f and by G the
counterpart of F , we number the symbols in g corresponding
to k(x), da(x), b, and dt as features 1, 2, 3, 4.
In our methods, flows in F are further aggregated into
windows based on their flow transmission times. A window
is a detection unit that consists of flows in a continuous
time range, i.e., the flows in a same window are evaluated
together. Let h be the interval between the start points of
two consecutive time windows and ws be the window size.
B. Anomaly detection for dynamic networks
For each window j, an empirical measure of Gj is calcu-
lated. We then leverage the model-free and the model-based
generalized Hoeffding test (Def. 1,2), which require a set of
PLs {pFθ : θ ∈ Ω} and {PBθ : θ ∈ Ω}. We assume |Ω| to
be finite, and divide our reference traffic Gref into segments;
the traffic of each segment is governed by the same PL. The
empirical measure of each segment is then a PL.
Two flows are likely to be governed by a same PL if
they have close flow transmission times. In addition, if the
properties of the normal traffic change periodically, two
flows are also likely be governed by a same PL when the
difference of their flow transmission times is close to the
period. Let tp be the period and let td be a window size
characterizing the speed of change for the normal pattern. We
could divide each period into btp/tdc segments with length
td, and combine corresponding segments of different periods
together, resulting in btp/tdc PLs.
In practical networks, the period may vary with time,
which makes it hard to estimate tp and td accurately. To
increase the robustness of the set of estimated PLs to these
non-stationarities, we first propose a large collection of
candidates (Sec. III-C) and then refine it (Sec. III-D).
C. Estimation of td and tp
This section presents a procedure to estimate td and tp by
inspecting each feature separately. Recall that each quantized
flow consists of quantized values of a cluster label, a distance
to cluster center, a flow size and a flow duration, which are
called features 1, . . . , 4, respectively. We say a quantized flow
g belongs to channel a–b if feature a of g equals symbol b
in quantization alphabet of feature a. We first analyze each
channel separately to get a rough estimate of td and tp. Then,
channels corresponding to the same feature are averaged to
generate a combined estimate.
For all flows in channel a–b, we calculate the intervals
between two consecutive flows. Most of the intervals will be
very small. If we divide the interval length to several bins
and calculate the histogram, i.e., the number of observed
intervals in each bin. The histogram is heavily skewed to
small interval length. td could be chosen to be the interval
length of the first bin (corresponding to the smallest interval
length) whose frequency in the histogram is less than a
threshold. In addition, there may be some large intervals if
the feature is periodic. Fig. 2 shows an example of a feature
that exhibits periodicity. There will be two peaks around tp1
and tp2 in the histogram of intervals for flows whose values
are between the two dashed lines. We can select tp such that
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the peaks in periodic networks.
(tp1 + tp2) /2 ≈ tp/2. There can be a single or more than
two peaks due to noise in the network; in either case, we
choose the average of all peaks as an estimate of tp/2.
If no channel of a feature a reports tp, the network is non-
periodic according to the feature a. Otherwise, the estimate
of tp for a feature a (denoted by tap) a is simply the average
of all estimates for channels of the feature a. Although the
estimate of only one channel is usually very inaccurate, the
averaging procedure helps improve the accuracy. Similarly,
the estimate for td for a feature a (denoted by tad) is the
average of the estimates for all channels of the feature a.
For each feature a, we generate some PLs using the
estimate tad and t
a
p. In case that some prior knowledge of td
and tp is available, the family of candidate PLs can include
the PLs calculated based on this prior knowledge.
D. PL refinement with integer programming
The larger the family of PLs we use in generalized
hypothesis testing, the more likely we will overfit Gref ,
leading to poor results. Furthermore, a smaller family of
PLs reduces the computational cost. This section introduces
a method to refine the family of candidate PLs.
For simplicity, we only describe the procedure for the
model-free method. The procedure for the model-based
method is similar. Hereafter, the divergence between a col-
lection of flows and a PL is equivalent to the divergence
between the empirical measure of these flows and the PL.
Suppose the family (namely the set) of candidate PLs is
the set P = {pF1 , . . . ,pFN} of cardinality N . Because no
alarm should be reported for Gref , or any segment of Gref ,
our primary objective is to choose the smallest set PF ⊆ P
such that there is no alarm for Gref . We aggregate Gref into
M windows using the techniques of Sec. III-A and denote
the data in window i as Giref . Let Dij = DF (EG
i
ref ‖ pFj )
be the divergence between flows in window i and PL j for
i = 1, . . . ,M and j = 1, . . . , N . We say window i is covered
(namely, reported as normal) by PL j if Dij ≤ λ. With
this definition, the primary objective becomes to select the
minimum number of PLs to cover all the windows.
There may be more than one subsets of P having the
same cardinality and covering all windows. We propose a
secondary objective characterizing the variation of a set of
PLs. Denote by Dj the set of intervals between consecutive
window covered by PL j. The coefficient of variation for PL
j is defined as cjv = STD(Dj)/MEAN(Dj), where STD(Dj)
and MEAN(Dj) are the sample standard deviation and mean
of set Dj , respectively. A smaller coefficient of variation
means that the PL is more “regular.”
We formulate PL refinement as a weighted set cover
problem in which the weight of PL j is 1 + γcjv , where
γ is a small weight for the secondary objective. Let xi
be the 0–1 variable indicating whether PL i is selected or
not; let x = (x1, . . . , xN ). Let A = {aij} be an M × N
matrix whose (i, j)th element aij is set to 1 if Dij ≤ λ and
to 0 otherwise. Here, λ is the same threshold we used in
Def. 1. Let cv = (c1v, . . . , c
N
v ). The selection of PLs can be
formulated as the following integer programming problem:
min 1
′
x + γc
′
vx
s.t. Ax ≥ 1,
xj ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, . . . , N,
(6)
where 1 is a vector of ones. The cost function equals a
weighted sum of the primary cost 1
′
x and the secondary
cost c
′
vx. The first constraint enforces there is no alarm for
Giref for ∀i.
function HEURISTICREFINEPL(A, cv , r, γth)
Init: bestCost := ∞, γ := 1, x∗ := 0
while γ ≥ γth do
x := GREEDYSOLVE(A, γ, cv), γ := rγ
if 1
′
x + γthc
′
vx < bestCost then
bestCost := 1
′
x + γthc
′
vx
x∗ := x
end if
end while
return x∗
end function
function GREEDYSETCOVER(A, γ, cv)
Init: x0 := 0, C := ∅
while |C| < M do
j+ := arg maxj:x[j]=0
∑
i/∈C aij
1+γcv[j]
x[j+] := 1, C := C ∪ {i : aij+ = 1}
end while
return x
end function
Algorithm 1: Greedy algorithm for PL refinement.
Because (6) is NP-hard, we propose a heuristic algorithm
to solve it (Algorithm 1). HEURISTICREFINEPL is the main
procedure whose parameters are A, cv , a discount ratio
r < 1, and a termination threshold γth. In each itera-
tion, the algorithm decreases γ by a ratio r and calls the
GREEDYSETCOVER procedure to solve (6). The algorithm
terminates when γ < γth. In the initial iterations, the weight
γ for the secondary cost is large so that the algorithm
explores solutions which select PLs with less variation. Later,
the weight γ decreases to ensure that the primary objective
plays the main role. Parameters γth and r determine the
algorithm’s degree of exploration, which helps avoid local
minimum. In practice, you can choose small γth and large r
if you have enough computation power.
GREEDYSETCOVER uses the ratio of the number of
uncovered windows a PL can cover and the cost 1 + γcv
as heuristics, where cv is the corresponding coefficient of
variation. GREEDYSETCOVER will add the PL with the
maximum heuristic value to PF until all windows are
covered by the PLs in PF . Suppose the return value of
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Fig. 3. Results of PL refinement for the model-free method in a network
with diurnal pattern. All figures share the x-axis. (A) and (B) plot the
divergence of traffic in each window with all candidate PLs and with selected
PLs, respectively. (C) shows the active PL for each window. (D) plots the
generalized divergence of traffic in each window with all candidate PLs and
selected PLs.
HEURISTICREFINEPL is x∗. Then, the refined family of PLs
is PF =
{
pFj : x
∗
j > 0, j = 1, . . . , N
}
.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
Lacking data with annotated anomalies is a common
problem for validation of network anomaly methods. We
developed an open source software package SADIT [15] to
provide flow-level datasets with annotated anomalies. Based
on the fs-simulator [16], SADIT simulates the normal and
abnormal flows in networks efficiently.
Our simulated network consists of an internal network
and several Internet nodes. The internal network consists
of 8 normal nodes CT1-CT8 and 1 server SRV containing
some sensitive information. There are also three Internet
nodes INT1-INT3 that access the internal network through
a gateway (GATEWAY). For all links, the link capacity is 10
Mb/s and the delay is 0.01 s. All internal and Internet nodes
communicate with the SRV and there is no communication
between other nodes. The normal flows from all nodes to SRV
have the same characteristics. The size of the normal flows
follows a Gaussian distribution N(m(t), σ2). The arrival
process of flows is a Poisson process with arrival rate λ(t).
Both m(t) and λ(t) change with time t.
We assume the flow arrival rate and the mean flow size
have the same diurnal pattern. Let p(t) be the normalized
average traffic to American social websites [17], which varies
diurnally, and assume λ(t) = Λp(t) and m(t) = Mpp(t),
where Λ and Mp are the peak arrival rate and the peak mean
flow size. In our simulation, we set Mp = 4 Mb, σ2 = 0.01,
and Λ = 0.1 fps (flow per second) for all users. Using this
diurnal pattern, we generate reference traffic Gref for one
week (168 hours) whose start time is 5 pm. For window
aggregation, both the window size ws and the interval h
between two consecutive windows is 2, 000 s. The number
of user clusters is K = 2. The number of quantization levels
for feature 2, 3, 4 are 2, 2, and 8. An estimation procedure
is applied to estimate td and tp. The estimate of the period
based on flow size is t3p = 24.56 h with only 2.3% error.
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A. PL refinement
For the model-free method, there are 64 candidate model-
free PLs. The model-free divergence between each window
and each candidate PL is a periodic function of time, too.
Some PLs have smaller divergence during the day and some
others have smaller divergence during the night (cf. Fig. 3A).
However, no PL has small divergence for all windows. 3
PLs out of the 64 candidates are selected when the detection
threshold is λ = 0.6 (cf. Fig. 3B). The 3 selected PLs are
active during day, night, and the transitional time, respec-
tively (cf. Fig. 3C for the active PLs of all windows). For
all windows, the model-free generalized divergence between
Gref and all candidate PLs is very close to the divergence
between Gref and only the selected PLs (Fig. 3D). The
difference is relatively larger during the transitional time
between day and night. This is because the network is more
dynamic during this transitional time, thus, more PLs are
required to represent the network accurately.
For the model-based method, there are 64 candidate
model-based PLs, too. Similar to the model-free method, the
model-based divergence between all candidate PLs and flows
in each window in Gref is periodic (Fig. 4A) and there is no
PL that can represent all the reference data Gref . 2 PLs are
selected when λ = 0.4 (Fig. 4B). One PL is active during the
transitional time and the other is active during the stationary
time, which consists of both day and night (Fig. 4C). As
before, the divergence between each Giref and all candidate
PLs is similar to the divergence between Giref and just the
selected PLs (Fig. 4D).
The results show that the PL refinement procedure is effec-
tive and the refined family of PLs is meaningful. Each PL in
the refined family of the model-free method corresponds to a
“pattern of normal behavior,” whereas, each PL in the refined
family of the model-based method describes the transition
among the “patterns”. This information is useful not only
for anomaly detection but also for understanding the normal
traffic in dynamic networks.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of vanilla and robust methods. (A), (B) show detection
results of vanilla and robust model-free methods and (C), (D) show detection
results of vanilla and robust model-based methods. The horizontal lines
indicate the detection threshold.
B. Comparison with vanilla stochastic methods
We compared the performance of our robust model-free
and model-based method with their vanilla counterparts ([5],
[18]) in detecting anomalies. In the vanilla methods, all
reference traffic Gref is used to estimate a single PL. We
used all methods to monitor the server SRV for one week
(168 hours).
We considered an anomaly in which node CT2 increases
the mean flow size by 30% at 59h and the increase lasts
for 80 minutes before the mean returns to its normal value.
This type of anomaly could be associated with a situation
when attackers try to exfiltrate sensitive information (e.g.,
user accounts and passwords) through SQL injection [19].
For all methods, the window size is ws = 2000s and the
interval h = 2000s. The quantization parameters are equal
to those in the procedure for analyzing the reference traffic
Gref . The simulation results show that the robust model-free
and model-based methods perform better than their vanilla
counterparts for both types of normal traffic patterns (Fig. 5).
The diurnal pattern has large influence on the results of the
vanilla methods. For both the vanilla and the robust model-
free methods, the detection threshold λ equals 0.6. The
vanilla model-free method reports all night traffic (between
3 am to 11 am) as anomalies (Fig. 5A). The reason is that
the night traffic is lighter than the day traffic, so the PL
calculated using all of Gref is dominated by the day pattern,
whereas the night pattern is underrepresented. In contrast,
because both the day and the night pattern is represented in
the refined family of PLs (Fig. 3B), the robust model-free
method is not influenced by the fluctuation of normal traffic
and successfully detects the anomaly (Fig. 5B).
The diurnal pattern has similar effects on the model-
based methods. When the detection threshold λ equals 0.4,
the anomaly is barely detectable using the vanilla model-
based method (Fig. 5C). Similar to the vanilla model-free
method, the divergence is higher during the transitional time
because the transition pattern is underrepresented in the PL
calculated using all of Gref . Again, the robust model-based
method is superior because both the transition pattern and
the stationary pattern are well represented in the refined
family of PLs (Fig. 5D).
V. CONCLUSIONS
The statistical properties of normal traffic are time-varying
for many networks. We propose a robust model-free and a
robust model-based method to perform host-based anomaly
detection in those networks. Our methods can generate a
more complete representation of the normal traffic and are
robust to the non-stationarity in networks.
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